Since its inception, the Lebanese
Republic has adopted an inherently discriminatory sectarian-based system that
sidelined non-members of the recognized religious sects in the country,
including atheists. A balance of power between religious groups has been
established at the State level in collaboration with religious authorities,
whose clerical courts are given free reign over personal status matters.
Religious authorities, in their
alliance with the State, have successfully maintained their monopoly over
personal and individual issues such as marriage, inheritance, divorce, and
custody – obstructing all attempts to recognize civil marriages conducted over
Lebanese territories and willfully discriminating against women with no serious
repercussions despite civil uproar and frequently recurring protests.
The State-Religion complex has
successfully silenced speech against its authority through penal code articles
317, 473, 474, and 475, in addition to deliberate misuse of vague laws. Any
such criticism is faced with meticulously orchestrated and coordinated legal
procedures, threats, physical aggression, and accusations of blasphemy,
contempt of religion, desecration of religious symbols, and provoking sectarian
strife in the country.
In the period extending from 2018
to 2020, there were over 16 reported cases of musicians, journalists, and
activists prosecuted for blasphemy or provoking confessional strife. State
prosecutors and security agencies mishandled many of these cases by selectively
applying the law, failing to follow standard procedures, and pressuring
individuals under duress to sign pledges and remove content, or banning social
media use altogether, even before appearing before a court.
These articles of the Lebanese
Penal Code are inconsistent and contradictory with the international treaties
signed by Lebanon, which, according to law hierarchy, must precede local laws.
Furthermore, these articles of the Penal Code are also in contradiction with
the constitution and vis-ŕ-vis each other.
In section 2, we give an overview
about sectarianism in Lebanon, covering some historical aspects as well as the
exclusion of non-religious individuals or groups by the constitution. In
section 3, we discuss freedom of religion in Lebanon and delve into the
details of civil rights. Freedom of expression was highlighted in section 4 as
it was one of the most violated freedoms in the country. In particular, we
highlight the restrictions imposed by the law as well as the articles of the
Penal Code which are usually used to impose these restrictions. Some cases of
violation if the law were listed and discussed in section 5. Based on the above
sections, a legal analysis was provided in section 6 discussing the oddities
and absurdities of the Lebanese law. Finally, we conclude with a list of
recommendations in section 7.
Atheists, agnostics, seculars,
and the non-religious are not officially counted in the census of Lebanon [1].
The country’s last official population census was taken during the French
Mandate of Greater Lebanon in 1932 when the atheist population was assumed to
be 0% [2]. Consequently, government positions, including seats in parliament
and high government positions, historically distributed across recognized
sectarian quotas, are not reserved for this segment of the population [2].
Since the issue of sectarian demographics is politically sensitive, as it
directly affects power sharing arrangements, no census has been implemented
since then [3].
During the French Mandate (which
began in 1920, was ratified in 1923, and ended in 1946), and at the onset of
the recognition of the Lebanese Republic (1920), the first Lebanese constitution
(1926), modeled after that of the French Third Republic, stipulated that
deputies were to be popularly elected along confessional lines. A custom of
selecting major political officers, as well as top ranks within the public
administration, according to the proportion of the major sects in the
population was strengthened during this period [4]. Thus, for example, it was
agreed that the president ought to be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister
a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shia Muslim [4]. A
Greek Orthodox and a Druze would always be present in the cabinet [4].
While the French sought stability
for their rule through this power-sharing scheme among the different Lebanese
sects, this practice backfired as it increased sectarian tension for decades to
come and hindered the formation of a Lebanese national identity [4]. A system
where sects compete over influence and power was always destined to lead to
competition and spill over to conflict [4].
In the period of the mandate, the
Maronite president was provided with excessive power (such as the ability to
choose the prime minister) [4]. Theoretically, the Chamber of Deputies, which
represents all sects, performed the legislative function, but in fact bills
were prepared by the executive, which was effectively controlled by the
president, and submitted to the Chamber of Deputies, which then passed them
virtually without exception.
After Lebanon gained its
independence in 1943, the National Pact, which was an attempt to renew the
political social contract in the country, further sidelined the concepts of
citizenship and national identity by reaffirming that the president, prime
minister, and speaker of parliament be Maronite Christian, Sunni Muslim, and
Shia Muslim, respectively [5]. Members of parliament and high government
officials also continued to be elected and selected based on sectarian quotas
[5]. Instead of trying to overcome sectarian politics, the political leaders at
the time went in the direction of re-assuring the sects of their political privileges
and highlighted the ‘equal partnership’ of Muslims and Christians in running
the country.
Yet the lack of a common identity
among the Lebanese, as well as the distrust and competition among different
sects, which was re-enforced by the sectarian power-sharing system, meant that
Lebanon would always be susceptible to political crises and occasional civil
wars [5].
In the aftermath of inevitable
sectarian armed clashes, most notably in 1958, and a bloody 15-year civil war
(1975-1990), also divided largely along sectarian and confessional lines, the
Taif Agreement was reached in 1989. The agreement, which ended the civil war,
yet again reaffirmed this sectarian arrangement, while mandating equal Muslim
and Christian representation in parliament and reducing the power of the
Maronite Christian presidency [5].
Although the constitutional
amendments in the Taif Agreement used more recent census data, all the
power-sharing quotas were still allocated, in different proportions, to the 18
officially recognized sects of Lebanon, and the non-religious were again
assumed non-existent. No quota was thus reserved for atheists, agnostics,
seculars, and the non-religious for government or parliament positions, or for
high-ranking public jobs.
While some in the non-religious
community in Lebanon call for establishing a “19th sect”, that is
for acknowledging the non-religious as a new minority within the current
sectarian system, Freethought Lebanon opposes such a demand and instead calls
for the secularization of the country with equal rights for all citizens.
The constitution of Lebanon
guarantees in principle:
a)
freedom of religion
b)
the freedom to practice religious
rites
c)
the publication of religious
material in different languages
d)
the State’s respect for the personal
status of every religious sect and denomination.
These religious rights are stated
in article 9: “there shall be absolute freedom of conscience.
The state in rendering homage to the God Almighty shall respect all religions
and creeds and shall guarantee, under its protection the free exercise of all
religious rites provided that public order is not disturbed. It shall also
guarantee that the personal status and religious interests of the population,
to whatever religious sect they belong, shall be respected [6].”
The Lebanese State officially
recognizes 18 religious groups; all of which are sects of Abrahamic Religions:
Alawite, Armenian Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Assyrian Church of the East,
Chaldean Catholic, Coptic Orthodox, Druze, Greek Catholic, Greek Orthodox,
Isma'ili, Jewish, Roman Catholic, Maronite, Protestant, Sunni, Shia, Syriac
Catholic and Syriac Orthodox [7].
Restrictions on religious freedom
can be enforced, notably the provision that religious groups do not disturb the
public order. This vagueness of what constitutes a disturbance of public order
has allowed for violent crackdowns on groups of individuals and heavy metal
fans who were allegedly Satanists since the mid-1990s [8].
The Taif Agreement that ended
Lebanon’s 15-year civil war in 1989, established a balance of power among the
officially recognized religious sects and the constitutional distribution of
senior political offices based on religious affiliations and quotas. Although
the constitution declares equal rights and duties for all citizens without
discrimination, the confessional quotas, and thus privileges, may be viewed as
inherently discriminatory against both the non-religious and against
individuals of non-recognized religious groups. This conflicts with the constitutional
declaration of equal rights, and hence renders the constitution
self-contradictory.
Furthermore, the reference to freedom of religion in the constitution
is also self-contradicting. Article 9, mentioned above, both affirms absolute
freedom of conscience while also affirming that the State renders homage to the
God Almighty.
The constitution also gives the sects the right to establish their own educational
institutions [6]. However, the religious authorities wanted to further expand
their influence, so they effectively lobbied the state to enforce mandatory
religious teaching classes within public schools starting in the year 2000 [31].
The religious sects also objected to any attempts of the state to monitor the
content of these classes [31]. Thus, each public-school hosts religious classes
that are unique to the sectarian composition of most of the students in that
school [31]. In instances where a school is demographically mixed, students are
divided into separate rooms during religious class [31]. The teachers would be appointed by religious institutions,
rather than the state, and students are taught from a young age that religious
difference is a non-bridgeable and fundamental difference in Lebanon [31]. This
in turn reinforces the problematic nature of sectarianism in Lebanese society
and within the Lebanese political realm.
A religious group can seek
official recognition by the State through a process of submitting its doctrines
and moral principles for State approval [9]. The State would accordingly review
the request to ensure that the teachings are not in conflict with dominant
social values, or the laws of the nation as stipulated by the constitution [9].
A simple majority vote is needed in parliament for legislation and State
recognition of a religion in Lebanon. Consequently, benefits are accrued by the
religious group in the form of tax exemptions and the free application of
religious values to personal status matters [9].
Not all religious groups in
Lebanon are recognized. Some of these sects include Buddhists, Hindus, Baha’is,
and various Protestant Christian groups [9]. Sect members are free to assemble
and practice their religious rites freely, yet they do not qualify for certain
government positions, nor is a quota allocated for these sects in public sector
employment [9]. Additionally, Lebanese law does not allow them to legally
marry, divorce, or inherit property in the country [9]. Unrecognized groups are
however free to register under the recognized religions [9].
The above legal disadvantages
apply equally to citizens who have relinquished reference to their designated
sect from their official civil registry (ikhraj qaid) [9]. Omitting reference
to religious affiliation is not the same as leaving one’s religion, but only
that the individual does not wish to declare it. Therefore, the
sectarian-quotas based system effectively discourages individuals from even
removing the reference to their familial religions, assigned at birth, from
their official documents.
Personal status matters are
exercised by religious authorities in Lebanon, not the State. These include
matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and child custody [9].
The Sunni, Shia, Druze, and
Christian clerical courts are given legitimacy, jurisdiction, and autonomy by
the State to administer family and personal status law to their respective
communities [9]. These courts operate independently, with little intervention
or oversight from the Court of Cassation, on the condition that the clerical
courts abide by the Lebanese constitution [9]. Additionally, the State
authorities endorse the appointment of Sunni and Shia muftis and the Druze
Sheikh al-Aql, whose salaries are provided by the government and whose clerical
courts are subsidized through State funds [9].
The individual’s religious
affiliation is encoded on the civil registry “ikhraj qaid” [9]. This civil
document indicates personal status information and can be presented instead of
an identity card for government employment and university enrollment. By
February 2019, 10,000 people in Lebanon had removed reference to their
religious affiliation from their ikhraj qaid [10]. The procedure only requires
sending a letter to the Ministry of Interior [10]. Prior to 1990, religious
affiliation was also encoded on Lebanese ID cards. However, following the
end of the civil war throughout which sectarian militias installed barricades
and murdered other Lebanese citizens based on their ID card religious
affiliation, religion was no longer mentioned on newly
issued IDs, although the data showing the religious affiliation is still
embedded in the barcode present on the ID cards [11].
Proselytism is allowed under
Lebanese law [9]. Any individual may convert or change their religious
affiliation, subject to the approval of the head of the religious group that
the individual seeks to join [9].
In personal status matters,
Lebanon still falls behind on women’s rights. Women were found to face
significantly more obstacles in law and court procedures in various forms. A
review of personal status laws by Human Rights Watch found “a clear pattern
of women from all sects being treated worse than men”, especially in cases of
custody and divorce, both under the jurisdiction of clerical courts [12].
In 2014, the Parliament passed
new laws to protect women from domestic violence, and in December 2020, the
laws were further expanded in scope but still failed to specify marital rape in
their amendments because of fierce opposition from Muslim-majority political
parties that argued in previous years that a husband has the religious right to
have intercourse with his wife, even if she objects [12]. Today, many Lebanese
women remain vulnerable as marital rape is yet to be specifically criminalized,
while sect-specific courts continue to have jurisdiction over marital matters. Additionally,
Lebanese women are still denied the right to pass Lebanese nationality to
their children, with the possibility of leaving their children stateless, while
Lebanese men are guaranteed that same right [12]. Anti-government protests in
2020 also expressed opposition to this discriminatory law.
The absence of procedures for
civil marriage in Lebanon make intermarriage difficult to arrange in practice
between members of some groups, notably in religious courts when the male is
from a different religion, and in the case of Druze courts where mixed
marriages are rejected. Absence of civil marriage is not just a hurdle to
intermarriage. Many citizens who are of the same sect, on paper, strongly prefer
a civil marriage rather than a religious one.
The Government does however
recognize and register civil marriage ceremonies performed abroad, irrespective
of the partners’ religious affiliations, given that a recorded civil marriage
in Lebanon does not negate the religious affiliations of the partners [9].
The clerical courts’ laws would
still apply on inheritance, and in various cases, as when a Christian man
marries a Muslim woman, clerical courts do not permit inheritance from one
partner to another [13]. It is also forbidden in this case for a Muslim mother
to leave an inheritance to her children should they be registered as Christians
on official government documents [13]. The Christian father, however, can pass
an inheritance to his Christian children, registered under the same religious
affiliation [13].
Religious groups have opposed the
discussion and implementation of civil marriages in Lebanon since the 1930s
during the French mandate and later in the 1950s when it was first debated in
parliament [10]. It is important to note that the right to have a civil
marriage in Lebanon has been guaranteed since 1936, but there has been no law
to govern how this right is exercised [13]. Attempts to block civil marriage
have therefore focused on preventing a Lebanese law for civil marriage, even if
it is optional civil marriage [10].
Given that the legal right (but
not the governing law) has been realized since 1936, religious authorities
cannot block the registration of civil marriage among Lebanese people when they
marry abroad (in which case the law of that country, such as Cyprus, would
govern the marriage) [13].
In 2012, an innovative legal
approach, compounded with favorable political pressure at the time, allowed for
the ratification of a civil marriage in Lebanon between Khouloud Sukkarieh and
Nidal Darwich, and this represented a step toward secularizing family law [14].
The couple took advantage of decree no. 60 from 1936, stating that people who
do not belong to any sect are entitled to a civil union, so the two removed
reference to their sects – Sunni and Shia – from their civil registry, which
had become possible to do since 2007 [14]. On September 30, 2013, Ghadi Darwich
(son of Khouloud Sukkarieh and Nidal Darwich) became Lebanon’s first newborn to
be registered without a designated sect [15]. The couple later sought, and were
granted, asylum in Sweden [15].
Other couples similarly bypassed
the ban, if only temporarily, since only 13 such unions were recognized by then
interior minister Marwan Charbel [10]. His successor, Nohad Machnouk, under
pressure from religious groups, blocked the registration of other such civil
marriages in Lebanon, leaving 37 civil unions without state recognition [10].
These couples then had to remarry abroad so that their children could be
officially recognized [10].
Lebanon’s Sunni Grand Mufti,
Sheikh Mohammed Rashid Kabbani, issued a fatwa decrying civil marriage and
calling for the punishment of those who approved it [16]. The statement was
issued on the Dar al Fatwa website in January 2013:
“Any Muslim with legal or
executive authority in Lebanon who supports the legalization of civil marriage
is an apostate and outside the religion of Islam […] There are predators
lurking among us, trying to sow the bacteria of civil marriage in Lebanon, but
they should know that the religious scholars will not hesitate to do their duty
[16].”
The Higher Shia council also
spoke against legalizing civil marriage in the country [14]. The Christian
Maronite Patriarchy also has in previous decades fiercely opposed legalizing
civil marriage in Lebanon, calling for “solidarity” with Lebanon’s Muslim community
in opposing civil marriage [17].
Wadih Asmar, president of the
Lebanese Center for Human Rights, links the resistance of religious authorities
against civil marriages in Lebanon to their fear of losing power over their
communities [10]. An additional incentive for resistance, according to Asmar,
is the fact that religious ceremonies constitute an important source of income
for religious authorities, roughly estimated at over 10 million US dollars
annually [10].
The Lebanese constitution
guarantees freedom of expression in Articles 13: “the freedom to express one's opinion orally
or in writing, the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, and the
freedom of association are guaranteed within the limits established by law [6].”
Although press freedom is also
guaranteed in the Publications Law, free expression is constrained at the
intersection of religious freedom. The government can legally censor
publications it foresees as grounds to sectarian discord or national security
threats [6]. Severe penalties in the form of fines and prison sentences also
serve as a deterrent to free expression, under the criminal defamation clauses
[18].
Lebanese laws prohibit the
publication of any content seen as offensive to one of the officially
recognized religions in the country [6]. Additionally, limitations are legally
imposed on any criticism directed towards the army, the president, or religious
authorities in the country, under the pretext of instigations to confessional
bigotry, disruption of public peace, and the destabilization of the country’s
sovereignty, unity, borders, and external relations [6]. Failing to adhere to
one of such vaguely defined abstract terms could result in hyperbolic
penalties, i.e., imprisonment from one to three years, and a fine from 50
million to 100 million Lebanese pounds [18].
Lebanese law remains unclear
on online speech in the absence of a regulatory framework. It is yet undecided
if posts and tweets are subject to the Publications law or the Penal Code under
the jurisdiction of the criminal courts [18]. This has resulted in conflicting
rules, such as in 2016, when “the Publications Court of Cassation ruled on
appeal that the Publications Court has no jurisdiction over content published
on Facebook, overturning the lower court’s judgment that Facebook can be
considered a publication and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the
Publications Court [18].” Yet following
this ruling, and as of this date, the publications court is still accepting
defamation cases regarding online posts [18].
The publications law offers
several guarantees, such as the prohibition of pretrial detention [19]. In
contrast, criminal law allows pretrial detention for accusations that may
result in imprisonment sentences longer than one year [20].
Furthermore, only an
investigative judge can interrogate the accused, in the presence of the
defendant’s lawyer [21]. The judge must then refer the case to the Publications
Court within five days [21]. This mitigates the possibility of security
agencies harassing, intimidating, and violating the defendant’s right to
privacy.
As observed by Human Rights
Watch, evidence shows an exponential increase in the enforcement of existing
laws that directly limit freedom of speech: an increase of 81 percent from 2017
to 2018 and a resounding 325 percent increase from 2015 to 2018 [18].
Consequently, institutional
limitations have confined the non-religious to closed circles on social media
platforms to echo their thoughts freely in a safe environment.
The Lebanese Penal Code, which
dates to 1943, contains four articles that are most frequently used as pretext
to limit the freedom of expression of the non-religious in Lebanon.
Article 473 of the Lebanese Penal
code criminalizes “blaspheming God publicly”. This offense carries a prison
term that can extend from one month to one year maximum [6].
Article 474 carries a maximum
sentence of three years for contempt of religion and “defaming religious rites”
or its promotion, less broadly, disrespecting Christianity or Islam [6].
Article 475 criminalizes the
“distortion of religious rituals or ceremonies or religious drawings related to
those rituals”, in addition to the desecration of religious and sacred objects
[6].
Article 317 criminalizes
“writings and speech intended to provoke sectarian or racial strife or [to]
encourage conflict between different religious sects.” The maximum prison term
is three years [6].
Human Rights Watch Lebanon have
reiterated the urgent need to repeal or replace these overly broad, archaic,
vague, and poorly defined criminal insult and incitement laws, which are often
exploited by the Lebanese authorities for the sole purpose of silencing free
speech and expression [18].
In 2020, a “Coalition to Defend
Freedom of Expression in Lebanon” was formed by 14 Lebanese and international
organizations to tackle the repression of dissent and criminal defamation, following
the reported escalation in the repression of free expression and protests that
ignited in the aftermath of the October 17 uprising [22].
A 2010 proposal to amend the
outdated Publications Law has not been passed in parliament as of this date. The
draft reiterates the limits on free speech, in accordance with existing laws,
while further defining and regulating “electronic media”, placed under the
jurisdiction of the Publications Court [18].
Human Rights Watch are advocating
for the amendment of the laws and articles in the draft that constitute
“unacceptable restrictions on free speech” [18]. If the laws are passed in
parliament without the recommended Human Rights Watch amendments, these laws
would “set Lebanon even further behind” [18]. The purpose of Human Rights Watch
is to align Lebanese laws with international human rights law [18].
In the period extending from 2018 to 2020, there were over 14
reported cases of musicians, journalists, and activists prosecuted for
blasphemy or provoking confessional strife [23]. Critiques against State
prosecutors and security agencies’ handling of such cases can be summed in three categories:
a)
selectivity in applying the law
b)
prosecutors not following standard procedures
c)
pressuring individuals under duress to sign pledges and remove content
or banning social media use even before appearing before a court.
Lawyer Ghida Franjieh explains that “the punishment is the same for
contempt of religious rites and inciting sectarian strife and is up to 3 years
in prison. While contempt of religious rites is considered a crime against
religion, inciting sectarian strife is a crime against state security, and is
therefore not limited to religion only. Hence, it takes a sectarian, social,
and political character. Therefore, judges see incitement to sectarian strife
as more dangerous than contempt of religious rites, and are thus more severe in
judging such cases, which serves first and foremost to protect the sectarian
system by the judiciary [23].”
Charbel
Khoury (2018)
In July 2018, Khoury was interrogated by the Cybercrimes Bureau
after a lawsuit was filed against him by a Christian group because of a Facebook
joke about a Christian saint [18]. The Mount Lebanon public prosecutor ordered
Charbel Khoury to sign a pledge not to write about religion and to deactivate
his Facebook account for one month [18]. Khoury told Human Rights Watch that
the interrogator at the Bureau threatened him, saying, “if I see you on
Facebook, I will drag you by your hair from your house, and we know where your
house is [18].”
In the aftermath of the lawsuit, Khoury filed a complaint against a
former colleague who physically assaulted him at their workplace [18]. However,
none of the individuals assaulting or threatening to murder or rape Khoury were
investigated despite clear violations of Lebanese laws [18].
Wadih
al-Asmar (2018)
In August 2018, the Cybercrimes Bureau investigated Wadih al-Asmar,
President of the Lebanese Center for Human Rights (CLDH), for sharing a
Facebook joke that a religious institution deemed to be insulting to religion
[18]. Although the lawsuit against him was submitted on August 30, 2018, he was
called by authorities for investigation before the date of the lawsuit, with
the date of investigation being set on August 31, 2018 [18]. The mismatch in
dates, according to al-Asmar, may suggest “cooperation between the prosecution
and powerful religious authorities.” [18]
Mashrou’
Leila (2019)
In July 2019, Lebanese Byblos music festival was forced to cancel a
planned concert of Lebanese indie band Mashrou’ Leila “to prevent bloodshed,
avoid backlash from Christian fundamentalist groups, and maintain security and
stability [24]”. Mashrou’ Leila has gained worldwide acclaim for tackling
pressing social issues and speaking out against oppression, corruption, and
homophobia in the Arab world [18]. Some reports state that objections were
related to two songs which were allegedly blasphemous [25]. Other reports state
that the uproar was caused by an insult to Christian beliefs, citing a then
four-year-old Facebook post on the personal page of Hamed Sinno (Mashrou’
Leila’s vocalist) that transposed the face of pop diva Madonna onto an image of
the Virgin Mary, noting that Sinno did not create the post but shared it from
another source [25].
Legal complaints against the band were lodged by Catholic Church
affiliated groups and blogger Philippe Seif, who condemned the band in a
Facebook post: “Mashrou’ Leila’s legs should be broken before they set foot
again in Byblos [26].” On July 22, a lawyer affiliated with religious groups
filed a complaint with the public prosecution accusing the band of insulting
religious rituals and inciting sectarian tensions through their social media
posts and song lyrics [18].
The prosecution summoned some of the band’s members for
interrogation two days after the complaint [27]. State Security questioned the
band members for six hours before forcing them to sign pledges to censor some
of their social media content and issue a public apology [27]. Mount Lebanon
public prosecutor Judge Ghada Aoun ordered their release on the condition that
the band members meet with the Archbishop of the Maronite Archdiocese of Jbeil
[23].
The prosecution dismissed the complaint filed by 11 rights groups
on July 30, 2019 calling for an investigation into the threats issued against
the band, including incitement to violence and death threats [24].
Said Abdallah
(2020)
In October 2020, Said Abdallah was imprisoned for 46 days for
contempt of the President and inciting religious strife by posting on his
Facebook account criticism of the Lebanese president and jokes about the Christian
faith [28]. On January 21, 2021, following a lawsuit by Druze religious
authorities, Abdallah was called in again for investigation by the Cybercrimes
Bureau regarding posts criticizing the Druze sect [28]. He was blindfolded by
military intelligence, intimidated, insulted, and then forced to unlock his
phone and delete social media content from his personal profile [28]. The
public prosecutor ordered his imprisonment and transferred his case to the
criminal prosecutor before being released eight days later [28].
In their November 2019 report on the criminalization of free speech
in Lebanon, Human Rights Watch detailed the contradictions and intricacies of
how the government applied blasphemy laws in practice. Charbel Khoury, in his
December 2020 article for Daraj, cites severe bureaucratic difficulties to
acquire the case details to discuss their jurisprudence in his article [23].
Our analysis in this section is not of case studies in practice, but regarding the blasphemy laws in
principle.
As explained in the previous section, the articles used to pursue
and incriminate “blasphemers” are articles 473, 474, 475, and 317 of the Penal Code.
Aside from being contradictory to the law application hierarchy, these articles
are both dangerous and absurd in the legal sense.
The reasoning for the inapplicability of these articles and their
absurdity is as follows:
The code of civil procedures that defines the work of the courts,
how they should apply the laws, and how to explain them states the following in
article 2:
Article 2: “Courts should abide by the hierarchy of
the laws: When an international treaty is in conflict with the regular law, the
first is applied.” [29]
Moreover, Lebanon has joined and ratified the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. The declaration states in its 18th and 19th
articles:
Article 18:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” [30]
Article 19:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”
[30]
Additionally, the Lebanese constitution states in its 9th
article:
Article 9: “There shall be absolute freedom of
conscience. The state in rendering homage to the God Almighty shall respect all
religions and creeds and shall guarantee, under its protection the free
exercise of all religious rites provided that public order is not disturbed. It
shall also guarantee that the personal status and religious interests of the
population, to whatever religious sect they belong, shall be respected.” [6]
We note here that in the Lebanese constitution, the practice of any
religion is limited by not disturbing the public order. It states that the
personal choices of belief should be respected, but it does not mention that we
must necessarily respect all religious rituals and ideologies. Freedom of expression
and the freedom to criticize religious ideologies, in any way possible, is
protected by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the articles
mentioned above. Given the hierarchy, this universal declaration ought to
cancel the effects of the articles of Lebanese laws. In addition, the universal
declaration confirms article 13 of the Lebanese constitution that guarantees
Lebanese citizens their freedom of speech.
Article 13: “The freedom to express one’s opinion
orally or in writing, the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, and
the freedom of association are guaranteed within the limits established by
law.” [6]
This article is in conjunction with the segment of article 9 that
clearly states: “free exercise of all religious rites provided that public
order is not disturbed [6].”
The Lebanese constitution states in article 7:
Article 7: “All Lebanese shall be equal before the
law. They shall equally enjoy civil and political rights and shall equally be
bound by public obligations and duties without any distinction.” [6]
It follows from article 7 that the application of articles 473,
474, 475 and 317 of the Lebanese Penal Code should be equal upon all Lebanese
citizens.
Given the inherent contradictions among the Abrahamic religions,
their practice may in many cases foster inter-confessional and national order
instability, conflicting with article 317 of the Lebanese Penal Code. Publicly expressing religious beliefs may
also be used as pretext to insult, which criminalizes the behavior according to
article 474.
Such instances can arise in the event of one sharing Quranic verse
72 of Surat Al Maidah which claims that those who believe in Christ as God are
infidels: “Those who say, “Allah is the Messiah, son of Mary,” have certainly
fallen into disbelief. The Messiah ˹himself˺ said, “O Children of
Israel! Worship Allah—my Lord and your Lord. Whoever associates others with
Allah ˹in worship˺ will surely be forbidden Paradise by Allah. Their
home will be the Fire. And the wrongdoers will have no helpers.”
The beheading of said infidels is called for in Surat Muhammad
verse 4: “So when you meet those who disbelieve [in battle], strike [their]
necks until, when you have inflicted slaughter upon them, then secure their
bonds, and either [confer] favor afterwards or ransom [them] until the war lays
down its burdens. That [is the command]. And if Allah had willed, He could have
taken vengeance upon them [Himself], but [He ordered armed struggle] to test
some of you by means of others. And those who are killed in the cause of Allah
- never will He waste their deeds.”
Hence, expressing belief in one’s own religion can be considered
grounds for disturbing the national order as criminalized in the Lebanese Penal
Code.
It is therefore unjust to prosecute non-violent civilians for
mocking religions. It is an act which neither aggresses nor threatens to
aggress against other civilians. While on the other hand, direct calls to
aggression are protected by the legal system under the guise of freedom of
religion.
It is first and foremost essential for the Lebanese law to:
I.
Abide by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that Lebanon
played a crucial role in formulating. Article 19 of the declaration ensures the
right to free speech of minorities in Lebanon, among which are the
non-religious.
II.
Consequently, articles 317, 473, 474, and 475 of the Lebanese Penal
Code must be abrogated, effectively:
a.
decriminalizing the victimless crime of blasphemy.
b.
nullifying the legal suppression of dissenting opinions and free expression.
c.
abiding by Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which necessitates that the laws be “necessary, proportionate, clearly
articulated, and intended to protect a legitimate aim”; noting that the Rabat
Plan of Action, signed in 2012, opposes blasphemy and defamation of religion
laws due to their incompatibility with the right to freedom of expression and
religion [18].
d.
limiting censorship over artistic expression beyond the narrow
restrictions permitted under Article 19 of the universal declaration.
III.
The parliament must reconsider the adherence to the sectarian power
sharing system. All citizens should have equal opportunities for political
participation and public office based on competency, not quotas. A gradual,
meaningful, and systematic transition from sectarianism to inclusive secularism
must take place. Steps to nurture citizenship and foster social trust must be
undertaken.
IV. Finally,
a civil personal status law option should be made available to the Lebanese
citizens. This offers individuals the freedom to be subject to their choice of
clerical or civil courts in personal matters, rather than having their rights
(marriage, inheritance, custody) forcefully controlled by religious courts.
This report has been produced with the
financial support of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.
The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of the publishers
and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position
of the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation.
We would like to thank Ali Shreif
for proofreading the document and Ayman El Kaissi for the fruitful discussions
and recommendations as well as formatting the final version.
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